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Exorcising Langdell's Ghost: Structuring a




A ghost haunts traditional law school casebooks: the ghost of
Christopher Columbus Langdell. Langdell founded the case method that
has dominated law school education for so long. Langdell's method has
been criticized for offering no clear guidance on legal reasoning, hiding
black letter law, unnecessarily bruising student egos, and ignoring the
artistry of lawyering and the distinct value that other disciplines offer to
legal analysis.' This essay embraces these criticisms, concluding that the
case method as traditionally conceived should not be the guiding philoso-
phy for teaching law.2 We must exorcise Langdell's ghost.
This essay will add to the earlier debate on law school teaching
methodology by applying these criticisms of the case method to the de-
sign of a casebook, specifically a new criminal procedure text. Critics of
the case method have typically focused on changing what teachers do in
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1. These criticisms are explored infra at text accompanying notes 6-26.
2. For effective analyses of the reasons for siding with the "cons" in the debate over the
pros and cons of the case method, see, e.g., June Cicero, Piercing the Socratic Veil Adding an
Active Learning Alternative in Legal Education, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1011 (1989) (sug-
gesting more active learning is needed); Steven I. Friedland, The Use of Appellate Case Report
Analysis in Modern Legal Education: How Much Is Too Much?, 10 NOVA L. REv. 495 (1986)
(decrying the obsession with appellate case analysis); Nancy L. Schultz, How Do Lawyers Re-
ally Think?, 42 J. LEGAL EDuC. (forthcoming March 1992) (manuscript at 1, 10-17) (empha-
sizing need to integrate doctrine and skills).
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the classroom (arguing, for example, that learning should be made more
active through the use of simulations and small group problem-solving
exercises) 3 without focusing significantly on the primary tool that teach-
ers use: the casebook.
I offer a criminal procedure casebook as an example for two simple
reasons. First, I teach criminal procedure. Second, the casebooks in this
subject have lagged behind experimental efforts at replacing the case
method in other subject areas. Designing a better book, however, first
requires an understanding of how criminal procedure casebooks are now
designed. This essay, therefore, includes a critique of Welsh White and
James Tomkovicz' Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Constraints Upon
Investigation and Proof, one of the newest and best criminal procedure
casebooks on the market. 4 The distinguishing feature of this book is its
thorough use of complex and interesting problems, an approach taken by
no other criminal procedure casebook. Despite this innovation, however,
White and Tomkovicz' text is still bound by the assumptions of the
Langdellian case method. Those assumptions are: (1) law is a "science"
distinct from other disciplines and therefore is best understood without
reference to them; (2) this science is best studied through exclusive focus
on appellate cases; and consequently (3) the "art" of lawyering (for ex-
ample, interviewing, counseling, and negotiating) is not a fit subject for a
"scientific" law school education.5
A casebook written in an alternative model-one that rejects much
of Langdell's basic teachings-would have four major goals: first, inte-
grating theory and practice in the way that the best practicing lawyers
do; second, expanding the ways in which students learn by doing in order
to teach them more about how practicing lawyers reason and ply their
trade; third, making the artistry of lawyering as important a subject as
appellate case analysis; and, fourth, teaching students to use the tools of
3. See sources cited supra note 2 and infra notes 16-23.
4. WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. ToMKovIcz, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF (1990).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 6-26. The "Langdellian case method," as used
here, means the long dominant method of legal education that has grown from Langdell's
philosophy, regardless of whether Langdell himself consciously subscribed to all the details of,
or variations on, that method or fully thought through its implications. See ROBERT STE-
VENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 279
(1983) ("[W]e may be sure that Langdell will continue to be blamed for things that he never
believed or at least never understood."). The three assumptions noted in the text, while likely
accurate statements of Langdell's underlying beliefs, see infra text accompanying notes 6-26,
are therefore important for another reason: they accurately reflect the unifying notions under-
lying most of the past and present law professoriate's teaching methodologies. See infra text
accompanying notes 79-98 (explaining why even the much touted "problem method" is really
but one variant on the Langdellian case method).
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other disciplines, especially the social sciences, in practicing both the sci-
ence and art of lawyering. The ultimate purpose of this essay is to sug-
gest how these goals might best be furthered in casebooks.
Part I thus begins by briefly reviewing the history, assumptions, and
criticisms of the case method and how it has been used to design
casebooks. This review sets the stage for examining the limitations inher-
ent in even the most modem variants of that method in casebook design.
Part II illustrates these limitations by evaluating one such modem vari-
ant, White and Tomkovicz' text.
Reflecting on these limitations, Part III suggests specific ways to
design a criminal procedure casebook that will address the flaws in the
case method. The suggested alternative model casebook builds upon de-
velopments already occurring elsewhere in the law school curriculum.
Still, this model does recognize that there is much of value in the case
method. The method is criticized, therefore, not because it has nothing
to offer but because it does not have enough. In short, I seek to cast out
Langdell's ghost but to respect its legacy.
I. Defining and Critiquing the Case Method
A brief review of the history, approach, and flaws of the case
method will help us envision what a casebook seeking to cure those flaws
might look like. To that end, we turn now to the latter part of the last
century.
Aspiring professions, it has been said, struggle for recognition as
fields requiring training in a complex, specialized "science" that uses a
methodology distinct from (and perhaps, within the relevant area of ex-
pertise, even better than) that of other disciplines. 6 This apparently is
what happened with the legal profession in the late nineteenth century.
Training in the law office gave way to training in the law school with the
arrival of the law's (and thus the law school's) patron saint of law-as-
science, Christopher Columbus Langdell. 7
6. See DONALD SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS
THINK IN ACTION 24-25 (1983).
7. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 74-76 (1976) (describing the rise of Langdell's method by the title, "Scien-
tific Expertise: The Triumph of the New Professoriat"). The rise and growing dominance of
the case method in the history of legal education are discussed in depth in STEVENS, supra note
5. Stevens suggests that the "scientific" approach to law and law teaching was partly success-
ful because of its snobbism. Id. at 53, 63. Langdell, of course, introduced his approach at
Harvard. Id. at 36, 52-53. Other "elite" schools (and those aspiring to be elite) quickly fol-
lowed suit. Id. at 63. Students thus began viewing attending case method schools as a way of
improving job marketability. Id. Beyond its snobbism, the "scientific" approach to law had
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To Langdell, "law was a science, the library was its laboratory, and
cases were its natural elements."'8 As a science, law emphatically was not
"a species of handicraft," to be learned through apprenticeship,9 but
rather a scientific discipline properly studied only by specially trained
researchers-law professors.10 Law professors need not, and indeed
should not, have training in practice, but only in law's version of scien-
tific methodology-the case method.11
According to Langdell's model, the cases are the only source of legal
principles and knowledge, the library the only laboratory worthy of the
name.1 2 Law study, therefore, consists of divining the universal princi-
ples that the cases unquestionably embody.1 3 To teach students those
other appealing aspects. Notably, the rising class of academic lawyers relished their growing
power and influence in the classroom and the drama that went along with the new method. Id.
Correspondingly, the method was cheap, permitting professors to teach large classes at rela-
tively little cost, a feature welcomed by university administrators. Id
Langdell's teaching philosophy arose at a time when jurisprudence was dominated by
"legal formalism," a term used here to describe a system of legal thought dominated by the
belief that law could be reduced to a science in which abstract principles dictated "objective"
results. See Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 221,
221-23 (1980). The implications of formalism both in Langdell's time and in today's legal
thought are beyond the scope of this essay, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE (1990) (discussing and critiquing various meanings of "formalism"), but it is
useful to note that formalist jurisprudence was consistent with, and so offered support for,
Langdell's teaching philosophy. It is unlikely, however, that jurisprudential theories had
much to do with the dominant focus on the divination of "scientific" principles from cases, for
the traditional case method has persisted despite changes in legal jurisprudence. Compare
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between
Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1236-40 & nn.17, 29 (1991) (noting
the many changing and competing jurisprudential theories that have challenged Langdellian
assumptions) with STEVENS, supra note 5 at 278 (predicting that this "remarkable and resilient
vehicle, the case method, will continue to dominate legal education").
8. AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 75; see also SCH6N, supra note 6, at 28-29 (noting that
despite law's "dubious basis in science," law schools' still-dominant Langdellian methodology
fits the view of professional activity as "science").
9. AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 76.
10. See id. at 75-76.
11. See id. at 86-87 (noting the "radical change" at the turn of the century to law facul-
ties comprised mostly of young men with limited, if any, practical experience); see also STE-
VENS, supra note 5, at 38 (describing as a "milestone" the appointment of James Barr Ames in
1873 as an assistant professor of law at Harvard because "Ames, a recent Harvard Law gradu-
ate who had scarcely practiced law, was exactly the type of professor Langdell demanded").
This disdain of practical legal experience continues among today's law professoriat. See RICH-
ARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 176 (1989) ("few [law professors] today have any experi-
ence other than a judicial clerkship and perhaps a year or two in government or a large firm
12. Robert Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in READINGS IN
THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 220 (Dennis Nolan ed., 1980).
13. Schultz, supra note 2, at 3.
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principles, the professor is to engage them in the grand discussion of
cases we loosely term the "socratic method."'
14
This method, however, has a curious feature. While the approach
aspires to teach scientific principles, the students never are told what
these principles are. Instead, they are expected to abstract the principles
from the cases. Yet, the method for accomplishing this task is never
made explicit. 15  One commentator has described the approach as
follows:
The Socratic method, as it is usually administered in the class-
room, consists largely of a set of "games," the most popular of which is
"Corner," a strategy that bears a striking resemblance to the ancient
ploy of Zen masters. The objective in each case is to drive the student
into a corner by refuting any position he takes. In being presented
with a zoan (a Zen question) or a Socratic question, the student is cast
on the horns of a dilemma: he is made to feel that there is some an-
swer he must find, but in seeking it out, he begins to despair of finding
it because everything he says is rejected as wrong. 16
As some commentators have observed, this approach breeds student
frustration and anomie.' 7
In fact, students do more than simply memorize scientific principles.
They learn by doing, and learning by doing should be at the heart of
professional training because professionals are doers. The case method's
great weakness is that it requires only one kind of doing-the reading
and synthesizing of appellate cases-and offers insufficient guidance for
doing that task well. But because of its emphasis on doing, the method
holds within it the key to escape from its own confines. Such an escape
14. Paul N. Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 457-62
(1970).
15. d. at 457.
16. Id at 457-58 (footnotes omitted).
17. This may be for no other reason than that the students are bored. See, eg., Schultz,
supra note 2, at 17 ("There is a general perception of ennui, of a 'tuning out' by upper class law
students, that... is mainly the product of the repetitious approach to law teaching currently
employed in most law schools."); Thomas F. Bergin, Jr., The Law Teacher: A Man Divided
Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 646, 648-49 (1968). ("To be mercifully brief, law school is
unmercifully dull .... [The only skill gained after the first year is the skill of feigning
preparedness for class."). It has been suggested as well that while the socratic method spreads
"havoc... among the egos," Cicero, supra note 2, at 1015, it is particularly demoralizing for
women. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137, 146
(1988) ("[W]omen are silent because the law school classroom environment, structure, and
language tend to exclude women or make them feel inferior."). In addition to scholarly com-
mentators, students have long objected to the case method. Even in 1935 Harvard students
complained that: the case method lost its value after the first year; lectures needed to be rein-
troduced; discussion should replace what had become a "dialogue between the professor and a
handful of students in a large class"; and something had to be done about student boredom in
the third year. STEVENS, supra note 5, at 161.
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could be accomplished by broadening the scope of inquiry in each case to
include professional practice and artistry. It also would include the rec-
ognition that appellate cases can profitably be studied without hiding the
legal rules from the students.
Indeed, such a transformation has long been underway in the law
school curriculum as a whole. First there came the recognition that
Langdell's method "deluded its practitioners into believing that law was
science, not policy, and that other scholarly disciplines... had nothing
to offer." 18 As a result of this recognition, policy is now the subject of
much explicit classroom discussion. Nevertheless, the discussion re-
mains limited by the assumption that legal reasoning is unique and by the
related tendency to overlook other disciplines, particularly the social sci-
ences, which have much to offer.
Second, growing pressure from the practicing bar and the public has
led law schools to provide some practical training, although usually in
the context of separate clinical courses, legal writing courses, "skills"
courses (relying on simulation), or professional responsibility courses. 19
Indeed, scholarly efforts increasingly are treating what lawyers do and
how they do it as a legitimate subject of inquiry,20 and some of the more
progressive law schools accordingly have adopted courses that focus on
the artistry of law and approaches to lawyerly problem-solving. 21 Unfor-
18. AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 80.
19. See, e.g., TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE at
xxiii (1991) (the changing legal profession has produced a "strong demand" for law school
training in interviewing, counseling, negotiation, and the like); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Inte-
gration of Professional Skills Into the Law School Curiculunv Where We've Been and Where
We're Going 19 N.M. L. REV. 111, 113 (1989) (observing that while there is some integration
of skills training in "traditional" classes, the vast majority of law schools teach skills via a
combination of discrete clinical and simulation courses). The pressure from the organized Bar
to expand skills training continues and is exemplified by the formation of an ABA Task Force
on the subject. See ABA TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROW-
ING THE GAP, INrIAL BLUEPRINT (Dec. 1989) (unpublished).
20. See, eg., Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987) (argu-
ing that while lawyers should protect clients' right to make decisions, lawyers may have to take
an active role to assist their clients' decisionmaking); Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of
Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotia-
tion Context, 34 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1987) (proposing a model for client-centered counseling
in a negotiation context).
21. One of the most interesting. stabs at "artistry" is a new course at the George Washing-
ton University Law Center entitled, "Advanced Oral Advocacy." Students study, write, pres-
ent, and critique speeches, opening and closing arguments, and appellate arguments with the
goal of combining sophisticated doctrinal analysis with art and drama. See George Washing-
ton University Law Center, Looseleaf Supplement to Course Bulletin (1991). Courses in prob-
lem-solving now are less experimental and have their own well-known texts. See, e.g., DAVID
A. BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION (1984) (textbook teaching the practical
skill of fact investigation).
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tunately, even these promising changes reflect the dichotomy between
"theory" and "practice," with theory still coming first and researchers of
theory (the teachers of traditional subjects) still being acclaimed over re-
searchers of practice (the clinicians and legal writing instructors). 22 This
dichotomy is unfortunate because:
The limited focus of most law school classes on derivation of rules and
policy considerations from appellate decisions cannot begin to approxi-
mate the thinking process that must occur in the mind of the compe-
tent attorney. Teaching students to think like lawyers loses much of its
meaning if that thinking is not placed in the context of what lawyers
actually do. "Acting and thinking must go together--or both are fu-
tile." It makes no sense to separate how lawyers think from what they
do.2
3
The traditional law school casebook compounds these problems.
The typical casebook, unlike legal education as a whole, probably
has changed little since Langdell's day.24 It likely consists largely of
cases, the degree to which they are edited varying with the particular
casebook. The cases may be followed by notes and questions that are
meant to provoke student thinking about doctrine, but more likely than
not are skipped over by most students (especially after the first year), and
often are ignored even by professors. A growing number of casebooks do
include at least some problems, thereby increasing the students' opportu-
nity for prior reflection on the application of legal principles to concrete
situations. Unfortunately, the problems generally are not designed to in-
crease student reflection on case-planning, strategy, ethics, negotiation,
and the myriad other daily aspects of lawyering life. Additionally, tradi-
tional casebooks generally are devoid of the simulations, writing exer-
cises, studies in values, interdisciplinary analyses, and role-playing now
22. Eleanor M. Fox, The Good Law School, The Good Curriculun and the Mind and the
Heart, 39 J. LEGAL Enuc. 473, 478 (1989) ("[C]linics ... existed in the shadow of academic
courses. Even though students thrived in clinics, were excited by them, and ranked them
among their most rewarding studies, academic faculty considered clinics and clinical faculty
second class.").
23. Schultz, supra note 2, at 13 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Frank Maher, Ivory Towers
and Concrete Castles: A Hundred Years War, 15 MELB. U. L. REv. 637, 644 (1986)).
24. See STEVENS, supra note 5, at 276-78 (noting the "substantive," as opposed to
"clinical," law professoriat's historical and continuing resistance to any change in teaching
methods and concluding that "teaching by methods other than the [traditional] casebook was
probably not congenial to most law professors whose chief and sometimes only skill was the
analytical one associated with the parsing of cases"). Absent a statistical study of the nature
and content of modem day casebooks, there is admittedly no "hard" data to support my de-
scription of the "typical" casebook; casebooks unquestionably vary widely in their approach to
teaching. Nevertheless, based on my own experience as a law student and a law professor, and
my continuing discussions with colleagues teaching disparate subject matters, I believe that my
picture of the "typical" casebook is an accurate one.
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so prevalent in the upper-level curriculum outside the traditional
courses. 25 By perpetuating Langdell's exclusive focus on the "scientific"
analysis of appellate cases, modem casebooks reinforce both the dichot-
omy between theory and practice and the inattention to professional ar-
tistry that characterize the case method. Even the best modem
casebooks likely fail to correct these flaws. This truth is effectively illus-
trated by examining White and Tomkovicz' new criminal procedure text,
the subject to which this essay now turns.
II. White and Tomkovicz' Text: An Effort to Rise "Above"
the Most Traditional Version of the Case Method
It should now be clear that the most important assumption of the
case method is that the close study of appellate cases is the acme of legal
education. In the method's most traditional form, cases are studied ab-
stractly, without being placed in the context of the types of situations
that bring lawyers to clients in the first place. Part II of this essay exam-
ines how White and Tomkovicz' text rises above this most traditional
conception of the case method. Part II, however, also points out how the
authors have remained tied to the case method's single-minded focus on
appellate cases, thereby failing to create a casebook that reflects how
practicing lawyers really think.
A. Structure and Content
In the preface to their casebook, White and Tomkovicz identify the
incorporation of a "considerable number of problems" as the "most dis-
tinctive feature of the book .... -26 In this, they unquestionably are
right. Although some texts incorporate a few problems, 27 and separate
problem booklets are available, 28 only White and Tomkoviez's text con-
sistently uses the problem method as the central feature of a single
casebook. As discussed in Part II.B. of this essay, the authors have done
25. Efforts have begun to expose students to these thinking-by-doing activities earlier in
their legal careers, but even these efforts generally remain separate courses from the substan-
tive ones. See, eg., Dan Braveman, Law Firm: A First-Year Course on Lawyerin& 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 501 (1989) (discussing the successes and problems with "Law Firm," a first-
year course at Syracuse University College of Law intended to correct the weaknesses of the
"traditional" first-year curriculum). Moreover, these modest efforts are hampered by the ab-
sence of effective teaching materials. It took two faculty members devoting substantial
amounts of three summers to come up with the materials for Syracuse's first-year lawyering
course entitled, "Law Firm" noted above. Id. at 506.
26. WHITE & ToMKovIcz, supra note 4, at viii.
27. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 84, 152, 790
(3d ed. 1988).
28. E.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1981).
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an excellent job on this score. Nevertheless, they have made other
choices that are less laudable. This essay now turns to the task of analyz-
ing these choices.
The text is 837 pages long and covers the "core" subjects of an in-
troductory course on criminal procedure: search and seizure, confessions,
identification procedures, and the exclusionary rules.29 In addition, one
topic sometimes covered in first year substantive criminal law courses is
included: entrapment. 30 There is, however, no separate coverage of
grand juries, discovery, guilty pleas, or bail and preventive detention.
These are all critical subjects that can be covered briefly at an introduc-
tory level and that have constitutional law aspects;31 they also are impor-
tant if any significant emphasis is to be given to white collar criminal
practice. Yet the teacher using White and Tomkovicz' text has no option
to do so; the "core" is all. This limited coverage will be of concern to
teachers who prefer to pick and choose among additional topics of im-
portance to modern criminal procedure.
(1) The Introduction
The book begins with a short textual overview of the steps in the
criminal justice system.32 Unfortunately, this introduction does not in-
lude a single document to make concrete for the student what happens
at each stage of the criminal proceedings. "Arrest" is mentioned, 33 but
there are no arrest reports or Miranda cards. Nor is there any descrip-
tion of the occasional (arguably more than "occasional") contrast be-
tween official police procedures and those actually practiced. "Initial
judicial appearances" and the "filing of formal criminal charge[s]" are
mentioned,34 but there are no complaints, no intake screening or lineup
forms, no excerpts from bail hearings or preliminary hearings. Small
portions of these items could be excerpted, included in an appendix, or
placed in a documentary supplement. 35
Such documents at the start of the text would help to set the stage,
bettering understanding by linking cases to real things. Later in the text
29. WHITE & ToMKOVICZ, supra note 4, at vii (outlining casebook's coverage).
30. Id; see, eg., PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT
449-71 (4th ed. 1990) (first year text covering entrapment).
31. See, eg., SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 644-70, 679-828 (covering all these topics,
including their constitutional implications).
32. See WHITE & TOMKOVICZ, supra note 4, at xvii-xxv.
33. Id at xvii.
34. Id. at xviii-xx.
35. Many such documents already have been collected in a brief pamphlet, DAVID
CRUMP & WILLIAM J. MERTENS, THE STORY OF A CRIMINAL CASE: THE STATE V. ALBERT
DELMAN GREENE (1984).
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the documents could serve a particularly valuable function; they could be
used as the basis for discussing strategy, applying legal principles to "real
world" situations, and demonstrating the link and feedback loop that ex-
ists among legal theory, negotiation, interviewing, counseling, fact inves-
tigation, and trial practice.36 Inclusion of a few real documents would
add much to the learning experience; 37 but as with most criminal proce-
dure casebooks, this feature is lacking in the White and Tomkovicz
text.38
Nor does the introduction include any discussion of the importance
of the realities to come as the course unfolds: of police beatings, fraud,
and coercion; of even well-meaning but uninformed or inadequately
trained officers violating individual privacy; of the need for a restraining
force on the power of the state; of the danger of convicting the innocent;
of the need to promote confidence in the justice system by catching and
convicting the guilty by fair procedures; of careless, incompetent, and
otherwise unethical conduct by prosecutors and defense counsel; and of
the dangers of an increasingly activist right-wing United States Supreme
Court.3 9 These matters would serve to do more than simply pique stu-
dent interest. (Although this in itself is always a worthy goal, for students
will not learn if they do not care.) Their mention also would introduce
the students to the many conflicting policies and "values" underlying the
cases, to ideology and conflict, and to the reality of the system's impact
on everyday people.4
36. See id. at 12-16, 32-34, 66-70, 102-04, for examples of questions effectively relating
documents to doctrine and strategy.
37. See GARY S. KATZMANN, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (1991). Katzmann's text
is fairly lengthy (unlike the brief Crump and Mertens pamphlet, mentioned supra note 35) and
collects many "real world" documents, including subpoenas, search warrants, grand jury tar-
get letters, indictments, plea agreement letters, immunity agreements, and discovery requests.
While both Katzmann's text and Crump and Merten's pamphlet are excellent for critiquing
real-world documents and studying legal strategy, neither has sufficient detail regarding legal
doctrine to substitute for a casebook in an introductory criminal procedure course. See infra
note 96 for further explanation of Katzmann's text.
38. The strategy of drafting a lengthy casebook introduction that addresses process, phi-
losophy, and tactics, while offering documents from hypothetical cases, has already been effec-
tively implemented by at least one author of an evidence casebook and can serve as an
excellent model for doing so in criminal procedure. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVI-
DENCE IN THE NINETIES 3-88 (1991).
39. On this last point, see, eg., Florida v. Bostwick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2385-88 (1991)
(holding that police boarding of buses at regular stops to search passengers' luggage upon their
"consent," but without articulable suspicion that the passengers subsequently searched pos-
sessed drugs, did not per se constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure"); Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1251 (1991) (admission of coerced confession may be harmless error).
40. For an insightful discussion of the significance of analyzing ideology in casebooks, see
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Nor does the introduction include any guidance as to how students
should approach the cases that they are about to read. White and
Tomkovicz, like most casebook authors, assume that students will divine
an approach by reading and discussing cases without reflecting on the
process of how to read cases, specifically constitutional cases in criminal
procedure. The apparent assumptions are that working with cases will
teach students what they need to know and that any necessary frame-
work should be provided by the teacher, not the teaching tool.
The introduction also reduces discussion of the debate about the in-
corporation doctrine to two pages.41 This is a defensible choice in that
the debate has little current significance for the practitioner. However,
this choice might constitute a missed opportunity, as the debate offers an
excellent vehicle for discussing precisely the question of how to analyze
constitutional criminal procedure cases. The opinions that make up the
incorporation debate are a wealthy source of information regarding the
role of history and values in constitutional analysis and the breadth of
sources relied upon by the courts in justifying constitutional decisions.42
Furthermore, the introduction lacks any discussion of the noncon-
stitutional aspects of criminal procedure. This is no surprise, for the title
clearly limits the subject to constitutional constraints. But the choice is
Andrew I. Gavil, Teaching Antitrust Law in Its Second Century: In Search of the Ultimate
Antitrust Casebook, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 189 (1991).
41. See WHITE & TOMKOVICZ, supra note 4, at xxvi-xxvii. The "selective incorporation"
doctrine holds that the Fourteenth Amendment applied some of the protections of the Bill of
Rights to the states, but not others. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 49-60 (1985). The Justices long debated three additional positions before selective
incorporation prevailed: first, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the entire Bill of
Rights ("total incorporation"), see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (Black, J.,
dissenting), reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 784 (1947); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-77
(1952) (Black, J., concurring); second, that the Amendment guaranteed only that process im-
plicit in the concept of "ordered liberty," whether or not contained in the Bill of Rights,
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166-74; and third, a
hybrid of these two approaches ("total incorporation plus"), Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516,
reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Adamson, 332 U.S. at 123-25 (Mur-
phy & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). See also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra at 36-48. The debate was
laid to rest during the 1960s in such well-known decisions as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 342 (1963) (states bound by Sixth Amendment right to counsel), and Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states).
42. For discussions of the differing historical views regarding the role of history and val-
ues in the incorporation debate, see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 41, at 49-60; Jerold H.
Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982); Leonard Levy, Incorporation
Doctrine, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1990). For a discussion of the
various data of and strategies for justifying constitutional decisions, see CHARLES A. MILLER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL
C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991); T. vAN GEEL, UNDERSTANDING
SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 47-93 (1991).
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one that ignores the critical role that the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure and its state analogues play in modem criminal practice. Also
ignored is the increasingly statutory nature of criminal procedure, as ex-
emplified by the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,43 Material Witness Stat-
utes,44 Wiretap Acts, 45 and the Bail Reform Act of 1984.46
I am not suggesting that all these matters could be covered thor-
oughly in a single text, or that it is inappropriate to make constitutional
criminal procedure the central focus of an introductory course. How-
ever, a sensitivity to the existence and usefulness of such statutes could be
developed by briefly introducing them to the students, as has been done
skillfully in other introductory casebooks.47 Of course, in depth discus-
sion of any individual statute or rule should await the body of the text,
but an introduction should alert the student to the existing types of rules
and statutes, indicate where to find and how to use them, and explain
how they interrelate with constitutional doctrine.
Additionally, White and Tomkovicz' introduction excludes any dis-
cussion of the importance of understanding people in general and the
client in particular. How can a defense attorney craft a strategy for a
suppression motion without first interviewing the client? How can the
attorney develop a defense strategy without consulting the client to learn
the client's goals and emotional needs? For example, the client may pre-
fer a quick deal to the lengthy and emotionally draining process of sup-
pression hearings and trial. Must not the competent attorney inquire
about witnesses, documents, and other sources of data before suppression
strategies can be crafted and dismissal motions contemplated?48 But
neither clients nor other people play any role in White and Tomkovicz'
text.
Finally, their introduction is devoid of reference to the ethical codes
that govern how criminal lawyers on both sides of the fence should be-
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1988).
44. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988).
45. Eg., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520
(West Supp. 1991).
46. Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141-3150 (West Supp. 1991).
47. The best example of such an effort is SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 109-11, 117-20,
151-52, 307-12, 696-705.
48. On the role of clients, people, and human feelings in lawyerly thinking, see D.
BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNsELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH at xxi (1991)
("[T]he client-centered approach is an attitude of looking at problems from clients' perspec-
tives, of seeing problems' diverse natures, and of making clients true partners in the resolution
of their own problems.") (emphasis added).
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have.49 The "pervasive method" of teaching ethics holds that ethics
must be stressed everywhere in law school so that ethical questions come
reflexively to the student's mind.5 0 If this method has any merit, as I
believe it does,51 the introduction to a casebook should provoke students
to think about such issues when considering the cases and problems that
follow. But neither the word "ethics" nor its synonyms appear in this
introduction.
In short, as is true of most criminal procedure casebooks, the intro-
duction is treated casually because it merely delays the important task of
getting on with the study of appellate cases.
(2) The Body
The body of the text follows a consistent and straightforward pat-
tern. Each section contains an "Introductory Note" briefly offering an
overview of what is to come.52 Such notes are certainly one of the
hallmarks of good casebook writing, for the notes offer a roadmap to the
reader of what to expect and where the authors want to go. But these
notes offer little more, since they do not offer any significant background
to illuminate the reader's path.
Some texts offer a discussion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments'
historical roots, treating such material as essential to an understanding of
the development and wisdom of legal doctrine in these areas.5 3 Similarly,
before delving into the case law governing identification procedures, the
reader would profit tremendously from a review of the psychological
literature on the factors affecting the accuracy of lineups. 54 Nevertheless,
such forays into history, philosophy, and social science are rare. Indeed,
White and Tomkovicz emphasize in their preface that they have "kept
textual material to a minimum," 55 adding that detailed discussions of
such matters are better left to "treatises, hornbooks, and law review arti-
49. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13, DR 7-103, DR 7-105 (1969).
50. See David T. Link, The Pervasive Method of Teaching Ethics, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC.
485, 485 (1989).
51. One commentator has described the value of the pervasive method simply: "Ethical
responses to particular situations should become instinctive responses, not afterthoughts that
are grafted onto the problem. Lawyers need ethical reflexes as part of their day-to-day func-
tioning." Schultz, supra note 2, at 9.
52. See, eg., WHrrE & ToMKovicz, supra note 4, at 1-2, 51-53.
53. See SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 38-45, 403-07.
54. See id. at 544-57 (summarizing literature). See generally, ELIZABETH F. LOFrUS &
KATHERINE KETCHUM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE (1991) (explaining psychological princi-
ples in layman's terms).
55. WHITE & ToMKOVICZ, supra note 4, at vii.
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cles. '' 56 But why is this so? Such discussions are certainly important
ones, for they are directly relevant to the creation, application, and criti-
cism of legal doctrine. Are the authors suggesting that it is better to have
students go find these things on their own without the casebook's
guidance?
If that is indeed the suggestion, it is an unwise one, for it represents
a missed opportunity for the teacher to help students learn how to use
secondary sources and such sources' analyses of history, philosophy, and
social science, in legal planning, strategy, and argument. Equally impor-
tant, the suggestion that students might go foraging for such literature is
unrealistic. When students turn to outside sources, especially after the
first semester of law school, they are more likely to turn to commercial
study aids than to hornbooks, treatises, and law reviews.57 The denial
that students use study aids is a pernicious fiction that clouds our think-
ing about teaching, for students are convinced that these materials fill a
need that casebooks and teachers do not.58
The authors also note that they reduced textual material because
they favor "focused questions and brief comments that encourage stu-
dents to do their own thinking." 59 My own experience in law school, as
both a student and a teacher, is that students, faced with the press of
preparing for multiple classes and the knowledge that most teachers pre-
fer to frame their own sometimes quite different questions, skip over brief
textual questions or give them little thought. In any event, the questions
and notes in White and Tomkovicz' text tend to be so short that their
presence offers little justification for the exclusion of more helpful textual
material. 60
These comments are not, however, meant to belittle the questions
that the authors have drafted. Many of them are quite effective for class
discussion. Some offer an excellent basis for an analysis of the meta-
theory guiding the process by which the Court crafts constitutional prin-
ciples. For example, Smith v. Maryland, 61 held that the use of "pen reg-
56. Id.
57. "The key to the Socratic method is that the professor never reveals what the answer
is. To get the answer, you have to buy commercial outlines, which cost $16.95 apiece and are
written by the professors to provide them with a handsome income on the side." James D.
Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1785 (1991).
58. See KENNETH GRAHAM, JR., CASENOTE LAW OuTLINEs: EVIDENCE D-1 (1989), in
which a law professor, in an amusing "conversation" with the prospective purchaser of the
professor's newly-written study aid, describes the claim that students do not need such aids as
a plain lie.
59. WHITE & TOMKOVICZ, supra note 4, at vii.
60. See id. at 65, 146-47.
61. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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isters" (mechanical devices that record the numbers dialed on a
telephone)62 does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court so held because it concluded that any
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed was unreasonable, and only
invasions of reasonable expectations of privacy constitute a search.63 Af-
ter reproducing Smith, the authors pose these questions:
How did the Court know that "society" was not prepared to recognize
the "reasonableness" of actual expectations regarding the privacy of
numbers dialed? If a public opinion poll had revealed that a large ma-
jority of citizens would recognize the legitimacy of such an expecta-
tion, would the Court's analysis and conclusion have differed?64
The questions raise the problem of "normative constitutional
factfinding," the process of finding "facts" necessary to support the
Court's reasoning in crafting and applying constitutional doctrine.65 The
process raises thorny jurisprudential issues, especially about the benefits
and limits of using social science in legal analysis. 66 Must the Court rely
on society's expectations to determine when the Fourth Amendment is
implicated? If so, how should the Court go about determining those ex-
pectations? Is the Court's unsupported opinion enough? These are not
"academic" questions, in the most pejorative sense of that word, but
rather intensely practical ones that go to the nature of good legal reason-
ing, the tactics involved in crafting persuasive arguments, and the eviden-
tiary question of how to prove constitutional facts that might help your
client.
But are the students really likely to think of these additional ques-
tions on their own merely from reading the brief, more encompassing
questions posed by the authors? More importantly, would not the stu-
dents and the class discussion benefit from an overall framework of how
to answer such questions, a framework that might be criticized and ap-
plied in class discussion? Professor David Faigman recently wrote an
excellent article that proposes precisely such a framework. Excerpts
from that article, for example, would have added much to the notes and
questions on Smith posed by the authors.67
62. I at 736 n.1.
63. Id. at 740, 743-44.
64. WHrrE & TOMKOViCZ, supra note 4, at 22.
65. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding" Exploring the Em-
pirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 548-50 (1991).
66. See id. at 548-51.
67. See itL Professor Faigman's article is offered as an example because it is the best
recent effort on these questions, but it may not have been in print early enough to be included
in White and Tomkovicz' text. Many other excellent sources, however, have long been avail-
able on constitutional fact-finding and the role of social science in that process. See JOHN
November 1991]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The authors' notes and questions sometimes take the form of brief
hypotheticals that, if considered by the students in advance, would help
them to test the limits of legal rules and their underlying rationales.
Take the treatment of California v. Ciraolo,6S for example. In Ciraolo
police flew over Ciraolo's property because they were otherwise unable to
confirm a tip that they would find marijuana there. Their flight revealed
seventy-three marijuana plants, which they seized. The Court "readily
conclude[d]," based in part on the physically nonintrusive manner of the
observations and the fact that any member of the flying public could
make those same observations, that any expectation of privacy was un-
reasonable.69 The authors follow Ciraolo with a series of mini-hypotheti-
cals that vary the facts. "If Officer Schultz had climbed a ladder or
nearby telephone pole and peered down into Mr. Ciraolo's backyard
would the result have been the same? Why?' 70 What if Officer Schultz
had "peered through a knothole?" or "unlatched a gate and stepped six
inches inside the fence to get a better look. . . ?",71 "What if he had
hovered over the yard in a helicopter?" 72 These questions point out the
problems with the majority's reasoning and emphasize the difficulty of
drawing a bright-line to determine when an expectation of privacy is
"reasonable" and when it is not. Furthermore, the questions point out
the inadequate attention given by the Court to crafting a clear, explicit
method for making such judgments. Given their brevity, however, these
hypotheticals' usefulness as potential teaching aids is no justification for
neglecting textual explanations of meta-theory or for failing to reproduce
portions of articles that might stimulate clearer thinking in considering
these questions.
One final reason is offered for abjuring text: apart from problems
and the brief notes and questions, the authors prefer "to allow the
Supreme Court to speak for itself."7 3 Therefore only United States
Supreme Court opinions are used, only the "core analytical elements" of
the majority opinions are retained, and only the "significant reasoning of
concurring and dissenting opinions" is offered. 74 Some cases are in-
cluded purely to promote appreciation for the historical roots and evolu-
MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 134-
250 (2d ed. 1989) (collecting sources).
68. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
69. Id. at 214.
70. WHITE & ToMKOVICZ, supra note 4, at 36.
71. Id.
72. Id.




tion of certain doctrines.7 5 But note cases "that do not enable students to
come to grips with the Justices' reasoning" are sharply limited.76
None of this is inherently objectionable. The difficulty is in the in-
sistence on a one note theme, a single way to teach the myriad aspects of
legal doctrine and analysis. Though repetition has its value, given the
already heavy emphasis in law school on appellate opinions, is it so
wrong to offer some variety? One suggestion is to retain the authors'
approach for some issues so that in depth analysis of appellate case rea-
soning is possible. At many points, however, space could be saved by
using short textual summaries of leading opinions that need to be
addressed.
The space saved could be used for many purposes. A trial court
opinion might be reproduced in one section of the book along with the
Circuit and Supreme Court opinions, allowing comparisons of the opin-
ions to be made. Brief portions of suppression hearings from leading
cases might be included to allow for debate about the lawyers' strategy
and the quality of their arguments. 77 Portions of articles critiquing
Supreme Court opinions from the perspectives of law and social science
or moral philosophy might be used. To frame a debate on ethical issues,
interviews with the lawyers from some of the cases might be included,
along with relevant portions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The point is that there is little reason to limit teaching approaches or
course goals to the analysis of appellate opinions, even when dealing with
so grand an issue as constitutional criminal procedure.78
B. The Problem Method
While the preceding discussion is largely critical of White and
Tomkovicz' adherence to the basics of traditional casebook content, one
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Professor Rice has followed a similar approach in his evidence casebook. See PAUL
R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE at vii, 34-43 (2d
ed. 1990).
78. The perceived "grandeur" of addressing issues of federal constitutional law on a daily
basis, and of closely dissecting Supreme Court opinions on those issues-a favorite pastime of
professors-may account for the especially powerful hold the case method has in criminal
procedure classes. Additionally, because those constitutional opinions involve crime, most stu-
dents find them intrinsically interesting, and they are therefore likely to spark lively class dis-
cussion. But while student enthusiasm is an excellent thing, it must not be mistaken for
student understanding, which may be improved by alternative or additional teaching methods.
Furthermore, addressing issues such as lawyering strategy, ethical choices, the role of social
science, and the art of persuasion, all of which are as central in attaining client goals in consti-
tutional cases as they are in other cases, is arguably every bit as "grand" and important as the
parsing of appellate cases.
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feature of this casebook that takes it far (though not far enough) from the
most traditional model is its extensive and thoughtful use of the problem
method.
The problem method is designed to develop the skills of "fact-sort-
ing, issue recognition, and statutory analysis."' 79 "Problems," as defined
in this essay, differ from "hypotheticals." A "hypothetical" is a fairly
narrow set of assumed facts designed to illustrate the application of a
specific rule of law, particularly where the rule may be ambiguous or its
application to certain situations unclear. 80 A "problem" may serve these
functions but also is a more wide-ranging set of facts that serves to illus-
trate interrelationships among rules or cases and requires a more mul-
tifaceted thought process--one closer to that involved in practicing
law.8' Two authors of a problem text explain the advantages of the prob-
lem method as follows:
Unlike the case method where the student is given both a filtered ver-
sion of the facts and a judge's statement of the relevant issues, the
problem method asks the student to determine the issues, evaluate the
facts, interpret the law, and draw and defend a conclusion. In short,
the student is asked to do many of the things lawyers do each day.82
One of the more important aspects of the problem method supporting
these claims is simple: students have the written problems before them
during nightly preparation, instead of being peppered with new hypothet-
icals for the first time in class. The problems thus enable students to
reflect before class on which cases might apply to the problem and why. 83
Also, the problem method is simply more fun. Most students find it
difficult to get excited about case analysis when there are not even simu-
lated clients to worry about. Problems create clients with lifelike dilem-
mas. Problems give the students a reason to read the cases more
carefully-the desire to help their clients. The more enjoyable learning
is, the greater the effort that will be put into learning the subject well. 84
79. NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW at xv (1976).
80. The questions quoted supra text accompanying notes 70-72 regarding the Ciraolo case
are examples.
81. See Stephen Nathanson, The Role of Problem Solving in Legal Education, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167 (1989).
82. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 79, at xv.
83. See Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDuC.
654, 655 (1984).
84. See Charles R. Calleros, Variations on the Problem Method in First-Year and Upper
Division Classes, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 455, 462 (1986) ("Because upper division students are
weary of case analysis and are anxious to engage in the kind of problem solving encountered in
practice, they generally are enthusiastic about using problems as the primary vehicle for class
discussion.").
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The problem method has been used in many law school classes for
quite some time. It also has made its way into criminal procedure
courses, primarily because of a wonderful problem supplement authored
by Professor Joseph D. Grano.8 5 Curiously, no criminal procedure
casebook has incorporated Professor Grano's thorough use of the prob-
lem method until now. Although a few problems have been used to great
effect elsewhere, 6 only White and Tomkovicz' effort provides adequate
material for a teacher to consistently use problems as the basis for class
discussion. Moreover, the simple newness of the problems is advanta-
geous, for Grano's text has not been revised in a decade. 87 White and
Tomkovicz thus have had the opportunity to include facts based on new
cases or areas of stress in the law revealed by more recent decisions. The
problems are also plentiful, almost every major subsection of the text
being followed by at least six.88 Placing these new problems throughout
a single text and in immediate juxtaposition to the cases offers the advan-
tages of convenience and thrift, for only one text need be purchased.
Most of the problems are lengthy statements of facts, ranging from
about half a page to a full page in length.89 Some of the problems ex-
amine ambiguities in the meaning, application, or limits of particular
doctrines. Other problems are cumulative, including issues covered in
previous sections and providing an effective device for review and a
means of developing exam-taking skills.9° The problems also layer their
goals through careful variation of the question posed. Thus, one problem
may explore the nature of appellate review and the question of when, if
ever, deference must be given trial judges by posing the question: "How
85. See GRANO, supra note 28.
86. See JOSEPH G. COOK & PAUL MARCUS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1986);
SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 84, 152, 790. The Cook and Marcus text, it should be noted,
made the greatest use of the problem method before publication of White and Tomkovicz'
work. Many of the problems in Cook and Marcus are, however, closer to what I have called
hypotheticals in this essay. In any event, Cook and Marcus' effort simply does not make as
thorough and consistent a use of the problem method as does White and Tomkovicz'. There
also is one advanced criminal procedure casebook that makes use of the problem method. See
CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., CRIMINAL PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1982). White and Tomkovicz certainly make the claim that extensive reliance on
the problem method is one of the things that "set[s] ... apart" their casebook from others in
the field. See WHITE & TOMKOVICZ, supra note 4, at vii. While it is possible that there is
another casebook that has in the past, or does now, rely as heavily on the problem method, my
own review of the books on my shelves and those of several law school libraries and my discus-
sions with colleagues support White and Tomkovicz' claim.
87. See GRANO, supra note 28.
88. See, eg., WHITE & TOMKOVICZ, supra note 4, at 45-48, 352-57.
89. See id.
90. Id. at viii.
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Should the Appellate Court Rule?" 91 Another problem shifts emphasis
to the trial level by asking: "Should the Motion Be Granted?" 92 Some-
times the focus is narrowed to a single issue, for example: "Were Lind-
sey's Statements Interrogation [Under the Miranda Rule]?"' 93 Still other
questions focus on the conduct of the police, asking whether the police
should have given Miranda warnings94 or should have conducted an au-
tomobile search.95
If there is a problem with the variety of the questions asked, it is
that they are usually phrased objectively in terms of what the "right"
answer might be. It would be more interesting to have more open-ended
questions asking: "What strategy should the attorney pursue? Which
arguments are best for the defense? Which for the prosecution? What
further information should be obtained before the defense crafts its strat-
egy, and how might that information be obtained?"
There are also a few problems that depart from lengthy recitation of
facts and present the transcript of a conversation. One of the most inter-
esting of these is an entrapment problem that reproduces the transcripts
of Philadelphia City Councilmen Schwartz and Jannotti's conversations
with two FBI agents posing as arab sheiks in the ABSCAM case.96 The
use of the transcripts makes the problem come alive in a way that fact
recitations cannot. Indeed, it would have been even more helpful if there
91. Id. at 688.
92. Id. at 689.
93. Id. at 537.
94. Id at 518.
95. Id. at 398.
96. Id at 443-45. ABSCAM was a government undercover operation in which FBI
agents posed as employees of a fictional multinational corporation whose principal, a fictional
arab sheik, was said to be interested in investing much money in the United States and in
emigrating here. Id. at 443-44. In the Philadelphia phase of the operation, two FBI agents
posing as representatives of the sheik met with Philadelphia City Councilman Schwartz. Id at
444. One of the agents stated that the sheik was interested in building a hotel facility in Phila-
delphia for 30 to 40 million dollars, but there were potential zoning problems, and he wanted
to "take care of" any problems before they arose. See id. Schwartz responded by suggesting
he could "control" the zoning problems; Schwartz was later paid $30,000 by the "sheik's"
representatives. See id. In similar meetings with Councilman Jannotti, Jannotti too suggested
that he could help the sheik and was thereafter paid $10,000 by the undercover agents. See id.
at 444-45. Those interested in the details of the ABSCAM operation should read United
States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982), and Gary S. Katzmann's text, supra note 37.
Katzmann's text should be particularly interesting to law professors, for he uses the real-world
ABSCAM case documents to illustrate the institutional (as opposed to doctrinal) aspects of the
criminal process, including the "roles played by key actors, the panoply of investigative and
prosecutorial tactics, the subtleties of the adversary process, and the nature of the penal sanc-
tion." Id at xv.
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had been more problems using transcripts or search warrant affidavits, or
even the addition of transcript excerpts from actual suppression hearings.
Little purpose would be served by reproducing any of the fairly
lengthy problems here. Suffice it to note that all the problems are well
thought-out, challenging, and interesting. Of particular benefit to some-
one teaching the course for the first time is the inclusion of a detailed
teacher's manual that offers the authors' equally thorough analyses of
every problem and case in the book.97 In short, for professors interested
in emphasizing primarily the problem method, there is simply no better
single text on the market. For the reasons noted above regarding the
advantages of the problem method, this is an important development and
helps make the text an effective teaching tool under the dominant model.
What is disappointing, however, is that the use of the problem
method does not go far enough. The problems offer the basis for discuss-
ing the value-laden, process-oriented questions important to the practic-
ing lawyer (in addition to, not in place of, the traditional doctrinal
questions). But this basis is not built upon in a way that departs from the
narrow focus of the dominant model of lawyering education. How might
a casebook succeed in so departing from the dominant model? It is to
this question that this essay now turns.
III. Structuring a Criminal Procedure Casebook for How
Lawyers Really Think
The discussion above suggests the contours of a criminal procedure
casebook modeled on how lawyers really think. One basic goal of such a
text would be to integrate theory and practice in the way that the best
practicing lawyers do. A related goal would be to expand the ways in
which students learn by doing in order to teach more about how practic-
ing lawyers reason and how they ply their trade. A third goal would be
to make the artistry of lawyering as important a subject as appellate case
principles. Finally, such a text would seek to teach students to use the
97. See WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES S. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF: TEACHER'S GUIDE (1990). On
the other hand, the teacher's manual focuses its analyses almost entirely on appellate case
analysis and application. The manual does nothing to cure the inattention to artistry, ethics,
and other aspects of lawyering that characterizes the casebook itself. What is particularly
surprising about this inattention is that Professor White has written one of the best examples of
a scholarly study that combines doctrinal analysis with discussion of ethics, social science, and
lawyering strategy. See WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1991). Presumably, he
has done this because he believes that such discussions are important to scholars and practic-
ing lawyers. But these same discussions are important for students too.
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tools of other disciplines, notably the social sciences, in practicing both
the science (in the Langdellian sense of appellate case analysis) and the
art of lawyering. 98
A. The Role of Theory
Remember that one of the criticisms of the case method is that it
gives students neither express guidance on how to approach legal
problems nor "answers" their questions. A casebook might respond to
these concerns in three ways: (1) by giving students a roadmap of how to
approach particular types of legal problems; (2) by not hiding the black-
letter law; and (3) by illustrating the application of legal doctrine to stan-
dard lawyering tasks, such as interviewing and negotiating. Regarding
this last point, casebooks should use lawyering tasks not only as a way to
teach the legal doctrine embodied in cases but also as a way to study the
theory of what constitutes performing lawyering tasks well (studying, for
example, how a lawyer can interview effectively or how to distinguish
between "good" and "bad" negotiating strategy).
(1) How to Approach Doctrinal Problems
First, the theory of how to approach classes of problems must be
made explicit, but also must be viewed as provisional. The explicit state-
ment of an approach to theory offers students a model for crafting their
own theories, but the provisional nature of the theory reminds them that,
in examining doctrine and lawyering activities, they must be alert to new
strategies for handling an aspect of doctrine and new approaches to
learning itself. Explicit attention to learning how to learn is central to
this form of pedagogy.
Thus, for example, my earlier critique of White and Tomkovicz' text
recommended that the introduction include an explanation of how to
read and analyze United States Supreme Court constitutional opinions,
particularly those involving criminal procedure. This explicit statement
of how to approach a particular class of cases should then guide students,
who will know what to look for as they read those cases. But the theory
offered must be viewed as provisional, leaving students free to critique
whether, given a certain line of cases, the theory makes sense or is
complete.
98. Each of these goals can be furthered both in the ways shortly to be discussed and by
adding a lengthy introduction on the methodology of criminal lawyering along the lines sug-
gested in this essay's critique of the introduction to White and Tomkovicz' text. See supra text
accompanying notes 33-51.
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At a more specific level, a casebook should offer an explicit state-
ment of theory in each sub-area of criminal procedure to be studied. The
"Introductory Notes" that White and Tomkovicz use could be replaced
with a series of questions that show how the Court approaches Fourth
Amendment problems, confessions, or the right to counsel. The ques-
tions would serve as a checklist for students, bringing order and coher-
ence to their analysis of the cases that follow. This checklist could
include commentary explaining how the Court's approach has differed in
the past, how the approaches of the various present Justices differ, and
what the merits and failings of each approach are.99 Such commentary
would encourage a reflective, critical spirit. Moreover, the guidance pro-
vided by the checklist-commentary's modeling would lead students to
read cases more closely, creatively, and profitably. Importantly, espe-
cially for those who choose to practice criminal law, the students will
have a model for approaching new case law on their own.
(2) How to Teach Doctrine
As noted earlier, many students turn to "black-letter" study aids as
a central, for some primary, means of learning the law. Professors, con-
cerned with the ambiguity of the law that is so central to their endeavor,
bristle at this "laziness" and oversimplification. Moreover, experience in
research and practice quickly teaches any lawyer that creative use of am-
biguity is a good part of what lawyering is all about. Nevertheless, both
the bar exam and large portions of most law school exams test the appli-
99. Portions of a question checklist regarding the Fourth Amendment might look like
this:
1. Does the Fourth Amendment Apply?
a. Is there government action?
b. Is there an invasion of a "reasonable expectation of privacy"?
c. How does the Court determine whether an invasion of privacy is "reasonable"?
2. If the Fourth Amendment Applies, Whose Privacy Was Invaded? (Standing is the notion
that the only proper person to raise a Fourth Amendment claim is the one whose reasonable
expectation of privacy was invaded.)
3. If There Was a Fourth Amendment "Search" or "Seizure," Was It "Reasonable"?
a. What does "reasonable" mean?
b. Does the Court determine "reasonableness" on a case-by-case basis, or does the Court
craft rules for determining "reasonableness" for particular categories of cases?
c. What are the existing "categories" of rules for "reasonableness"?
d. When and how will the Court fashion new categories and new rules? (the balancing
test).
This is, of course, only a brief segment of one version of what a checklist of Fourth
Amendment concerns could include. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 49 (1991), for an alternative checklist. Each question could be followed by brief
commentary suggesting potential answers and pointing out things that the students should
look for when reading such cases.
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cation of black-letter doctrine to hypothetical fact patterns. The stu-
dents' approach can thus be seen as a rational, albeit incomplete,
response to law school's carrot and stick: the grading system.
The study of black-letter principles without an understanding of
their ambiguities and without practice in their application will, of course,
gain the student little. Moreover, lack of skill in crafting new principles
and interpreting cases and statutes-skills generally not tested on law
school exams but taught, if not necessarily learned, in the classroom-
will be even more devastating for the practicing lawyer. But belittling
the study of black-letter principles prior to examining their role and limi-
tations in case law divorces the study of law from its practice.
New associates in large firms learn this quickly. It is not uncom-
mon, as was true for me when I graduated from law school, for a young
associate to be asked to tackle a complex problem covering numerous
areas that are novel to him. For example, antitrust, securities regulation,
and administrative procedure may all be involved in a single, complex
research problem. When faced with such a task, the new associate first
familiarizes himself with the new areas by reading hornbooks, articles,
and cases to learn the black-letter law. This does not stunt his talents.
He uses what he has learned to analyze cases creatively for his client.
But he cannot know what the issues are or find the cases or understand
them if he has not first learned the black-letter principles.
The lesson is not that traditional law study should be replaced with
the memorization of black-letter rules. Rather, it should lead to some
presentation of black-letter rules, including an explanation of the ambi-
guities in those rules and the areas in which no rules have yet been
crafted, before studying cases. This could be done to varying degrees:
several pages of text beginning each section might briefly summarize the
rules and note the corresponding cases or lines of cases in a brief outline;
alternatively, more thorough statements of black-letter law along the
lines of a hornbook might be tried. Either approach requires great selec-
tivity in choosing those cases worthy of classroom discussion to avoid an
overly long casebook.
The latter approach has been tried recently in a brand new civil pro-
cedure casebook authored by Professors Larry L. Tepley and Ralph U.
Whitten.100 The text is essentially a hornbook, but it is one that includes
numerous examples illustrating the application of particular black-letter
rules. The text also addresses ambiguities in the rules, discussing histori-
100. LARRY L. TEPLEY & RALPH U. WHrITEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE (1991) [hereinafter
CIVIL PROCEDURE].
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cal context and difficult policy questions and noting scholarly disputes
regarding what the law should be and how it should be applied.101 The
approximately 700 page text (designed for a course of up to 6 credit
hours) is supplemented with both a separate problem text and a separate
450 page "Case Supplement."10 2 The authors note that they assign the
text as background, exploring the issues raised in the text through
problems. They note as well that much class time is devoted to close
analysis of certain cases or to using problems as a vehicle for exploring
the cases. 103
The introductory criminal procedure course offers a much heavier,
perhaps too heavy, emphasis on constitutional law than does an intro-
ductory civil procedure course. Nevertheless, the two courses share im-
portant features: both involve the use of procedure as a lawyer's tactical
tool; both require some in depth analysis of United States Supreme Court
constitutional cases; and both should focus some attention on federal
rules of procedure and federal procedural statutes. Indeed, it has been
suggested that emphasizing the similarities between civil and criminal
procedure, as well as the differences, will promote better student under-
standing of procedure as a lawyer's tool and as a subject of scholarly
inquiry.1 4 Moreover, this approach more closely mimics the ways in
which practicing lawyers absorb and use doctrine to solve novel
problems. The success of Professors Tepley and Whitten's experiment in
civil procedure calls out for a similar experiment in criminal
procedure.105
101. See id at xv-xvi.
102. See LARRY L. TEPLEY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, PROBLEMS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1991); LARRY L. TEPLEY & RALPH U. WHITrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE SUPPLEMENT
(1991).
103. CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 100, at xv-xvi.
104. See ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FiS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE at iii
(1979). In their text, Professors Cover and Fiss reflect on why they have departed from the
traditional separation of types of procedure:
In 1974 we began to experiment with the traditional first-year civil procedure course.
We were led by two impulses.... The second was to drop the limitation, "civil," and
to consider procedure as a unified attribute of law that transcends the traditional
professional categories-those implied by the terms "civil," "criminal," or
"administrative."
Ia. See also ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988) (a casebook teaching procedure,
whether civil, criminal or administrative, as a unified whole).
105. This is not to suggest, however, that professors Tepley and Whitten's text is perfect.
They do an excellent job in improving the teaching of doctrine, but do not make a serious
effort to direct student attention to other lawyering skills, to ethical concerns, and to the value
of other disciplines. Neither do they place sufficient emphasis on learning by doing, for exam-




(3) The Lawyering Process
As discussed throughout this essay, the traditional case method suf-
fers from a selective inattention to much of what lawyers do. Practice at
negotiation, counseling, interviewing, drafting, and planning should be
part of many "substantive" law school courses. Students also need ex-
plicit guidance regarding how to critique and learn from what they do in
practicing these tasks.10 6 To answer these needs, at least a brief discus-
sion of the theories of what constitutes good and bad negotiating, coun-
seling, interviewing, and fact investigation must be incorporated into
standard classroom texts.107 The goal of integrating these practices into
any single course is not minimal professional competence; instead the
aims are: (1) developing a sensitivity to the legitimacy of those activities
as lawyering tasks; (2) learning a framework for critiquing performance
of such tasks, thus promoting self-growth; and (3) understanding the
value that doctrinal study has for a wide scope of professional activities.
If every "substantive" law school class added but one exercise in negotia-
tion and the like, the cumulative effect (particularly if supplemented by a
negotiation course or an interviewing and counseling course) would be
enormous. 108
B. Learning by Doing
As has been noted, a properly structured criminal procedure
casebook should emphasize learning by doing. This goal requires the in-
clusion of at least some simulations in the instructional process. Several
objections have been raised regarding the use of simulations. Specifically,
it has been suggested that: (1) the time required to draft a good simula-
tion is not worth its benefits; (2) some faculty members are uncomforta-
ble teaching particular skills at which they may have had little practice;
(3) simulation is a time-consuming exercise which may cut into time nec-
essary to achieve other course goals; and (4) simulations are difficult to
conduct in a large class.109
106. See, e.g., ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 19 (proposing systematic methodology
to guide student fact investigation based on inductive reasoning); Nathanson, supra note 81
(proposing an analytical framework for students to use in problem-solving).
107. See Gavil, supra note 40, at 223 (in antitrust casebooks, "'lawyering' should be ad-
dressed as much as 'law' ").
108. See Schultz, supra note 2, at 25-26 ("[I]f every member of a faculty agreed to add one
contextual exercise in each course, the learning experience of our students would be enhanced
immeasurably."). See also LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTERBROOK, DISPUTE RESo-
LUTION AND LAWYERS at xviii (1987) (containing interviewing, counseling, and negotiation
exercises for all the standard first year courses).
109. THOMAS E. GUERNSEY, PROBLEMS AND SIMULATIONS IN EVIDENCE: INSTRUC-
TOR'S MANUAL at iii-iv (1991) [hereinafter GUERNSEY, INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL].
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Professor Thomas Guernsey has crafted an approach to teaching ev-
idence that seems to address all these concerns. He has written a short
booklet, entitled Problems and Simulations in Evidence,110 which is ac-
companied by an equally short teacher's manual. The booklet includes
many problems, some in-class simulations, and some simulations for stu-
dents to do on their own. This last type of simulation is especially valua-
ble because every class member, not merely the few students selected for
an in-class exercise, participates. The simulations often involve "real
world" documents and cover interviewing, counseling, and fact investiga-
tion. 111 Most of the out-of-class simulations are followed by question-
naires to be read and completed jointly by at least two students working
together following completion of the exercise. In this way, students can
get immediate feedback on their performance. 112 These questionnaires
also can be handed in to the professor before class, enabling him to spot
areas where the class may be having particular problems.1 3 Addition-
ally, many of the at-home simulations integrate concepts from through-
out the course, thus promoting cumulative review.
Professor Guernsey's approach does not require class time for the
simulation itself.114 But class discussion can use the simulations for a
wide ranging analysis of: rule-based and constitutional issues; the ethics
of negotiation; the artistry of counseling; the client's needs, goals, and
feelings; and strategies for fact investigation. Adding even a few such
exercises to a criminal procedure casebook, giving the teacher flexibility
to choose among one or many such exercises, would add great depth to
the analysis of how criminal lawyers think about procedural issues in real
contexts.
Professor Guernsey's approach might also be supplemented by one
or two case files in the casebook introduction or a documentary supple-
ment that could be the basis for some problems. 115 The documents could
include both well-drafted and poorly-drafted products (from both an ar-
tistic and a doctrinal perspective), such as indictments, motions to sup-
110. THOMAS E. GUERNSEY, PROBLEMS AND SIMULATIONS IN EVIDENCE (1991).
111. See GUERNSEY, supra note 110, at v, 7, 92, 95-113.
112. GUERNSEY, INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL, supra note 109, at iv.
113. Id.
114. This contrasts sharply with the approach taken by Professor Carlson. See RONALD
L. CARLSON, ADJUDICATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROBLEMS & REFERENCES (1986).
Professor Carlson's simulations are designed to be held in class. His booklet also is aimed
primarily at advanced criminal procedure students, although a few exercises cover topics from
the basic course. Furthermore, his work, while artfully executed, is a separate text, not part of
and thus not closely tied to the content of a single casebook. See id. at xv-xvi.
115. A similar approach has already been followed in at least one evidence casebook. See
CARLSON et a., supra note 38, at 54-65.
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press evidence, and briefs in support of such motions. Critiquing such
documents in the context of teaching a particular aspect of the course
(suppressing suggestive identifications, for example) would offer another
means for introducing the complexity of lawyering into the classroom
analysis of doctrine.
C. Ethics
While ethics can and should be taught as a separate subject of in-
quiry, there is a growing sentiment that ethics must be made part of
every law school course, taught on an equal basis with other aspects of
doctrine and jurisprudence. 116 If students are taught to see ethical dilem-
mas as a part of every situation, they will learn to react to ethical
problems instinctively. Properly conceived, this pervasive study of ethics
should include more than just the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility. It also should include
consideration of what is right, just, and fair-although this approach ad-
mittedly may lead different students to different answers.1 17 The study of
ethics should venture beyond the ABA codes for two reasons. First, the
ABA codes simply do not answer every ethical question. Second, stu-
dents who learn models for analyzing the complex, ambiguous, and un-
certain issues of morality that plague the practitioner are more likely to
become professionals who at least care about such issues, and that alone
is a worthy goal.118
There is an enormous array of potential ethical issues facing the
criminal practitioner. No criminal procedure casebook could begin to
address them all, or to do justice to any single such issue. That is why we
have separate courses in professional responsibility. But neither breadth
nor depth is a necessity. The point is to raise the issues and offer students
at least some guidance in resolving them. Therefore, many of the
problems in a casebook should raise at least one ethical issue. Similarly,
relevant portions of the ABA codes and either excerpts from helpful arti-
cles or textual discussion of ethical issues should be sprinkled liberally
throughout the casebook. In addition, the teacher's manual should ad-
116. See Scott J. Burnham, Teaching Legal Ethics in Contracts 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 105
(1991); Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of
Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 75, 87 (1991); Link, supra note 50, at
485; Schultz, supra note 2, at 8-9.
117. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 13-21 (5th ed. 1991).
118. See id. at 21 ("Few of the problems presented here may be readily answered yes or
no."); Link, supra note 50, at 485, 488 (the pervasive method trains "compassionate attorneys"
in the model of "the lawyer as hero").
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dress these ethical issues to make them more accessible to professors who
do not teach ethics and who may worry that they lack the "expertise" to
lead class discussion of such issues.
Two broad themes might guide the perfect criminal procedure
casebook's treatment of ethical questions: first, the difficult tension be-
tween the criminal defense attorney's obligations to his client and duty to
serve the system of justice; second, the prosecutor's extraordinary re-
sporisibilities in comparison to other lawyers.
Illustrative of the first theme are the problems raised by the lying
client and the lying witness. A criminal defense attorney must consider
the possibility of offering defense testimony, whether from the defendant
or from witnesses, at a suppression hearing. While calling the defendant
himself may be a risky gamble, 119 it must be considered. This will be
especially so where the motion turns on a purely factual dispute: the
police claim that the defendant abandoned the drugs when he saw the
officers approach, but the defendant says that they searched him while
the drugs were on his person; or the police version is that the defendant
confessed spontaneously, but the defense version is that the defendant
responded to in-custody interrogation before being given Miranda warn-
ings. Each of these situations requires that the attorney be alert to both
the possibility of his client or witnesses lying and to the related danger of
suggesting answers to the defendant while interviewing or counseling
him.1 20 These situations also serve to remind the students of the client-
centered approach-including a focus on client needs and feelings-that
characterizes real world lawyering.
119. The "gamble" is risky because a defendant's suppression hearing testimony arguably
may be used to impeach the defendant if he testifies at trial. In Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968), the Court held that when a defendant testifies on the question of standing at a
suppression hearing, the government may not use that testimony as substantive evidence of the
defendant's guilt or innocence at trial. Commentators have concluded that it is likely, given
the way the opinion is written, that the Simmons rule extends to all Fourth Amendment ques-
tions considered at the suppression hearing, not just to "standing" questions. See LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 41, at 468; SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 354. However, in United States
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980), the defendant denied during cross-
examination at trial that he previously possessed a cloth from which a swatch was cut to sew a
pocket (in which drugs were found) into a co-defendant's clothing. The prosecution im-
peached that denial by successfully admitting the cloth, even though the cloth was secured in
violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. The Court's willingness to uphold this
use of illegally seized evidence for impeachment purposes suggests that the Court would also
permit the use of a defendant's suppression hearing testimony for impeachment evidence at
trial. See SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 354 (reaching similar conclusion).
120. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcS 109-41 (1990)
(summarizing lying client and witness problems and potential solutions).
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The second theme, involving the prosecutor's unusual obligations, is
critical because much of the message of law school is that the adversary
system demands a warrior-like mentality; winning overrides all else.
This message is particularly inappropriate for future prosecutors who
daily witness the win-at-any-cost prosecutorial mindset that is displayed
in movies and on television. I have had students express shock and skep-
ticism at the notion that a prosecutor's job is to "do justice," because the
only place that they hear that message is in their professional responsibil-
ity courses.
It should, therefore, be routine when discussing suppression motions
to emphasize that prosecutors cannot bring charges if they lack probable
cause. 121 It should be automatic when studying confessions and photo
displays to alert students to the dangers posed by police peijury, brutal-
ity, coverups, unlawful arrests, and racial discrimination, and to inquire
into the prosecutor's role in controlling, and perhaps even prosecuting,
such misconduct. 122 It should be reflexive to worry about the duty to
reveal exculpatory evidence when discussing the prosecutor's role in
presenting such evidence to a grand jury or in discovery. 123 Only such
repeated attention to ethical issues in both the casebook and classroom of
a constitutional criminal procedure course will instill in students an intu-
itive understanding that:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impar-
tially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose in-
terest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.' 24
D. Criminal Procedure and Social Science
Social science is important to criminal procedure in two distinct
ways: in creating constitutional doctrine, and in applying that doctrine to
a specific case. These two uses of social science are best understood by
illustration.
United States v. Leon 125 is the best known example of the use of
social science to create constitutional criminal procedure doctrine. In
121. Id. at 222; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (1983).
122. See FREEDMAN, supra note 120, at 224-25.
123. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 41, at 640-46, 753-64; CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHics 766 & n.87 (1986).
124. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (Sutherland, J.).
125. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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Leon, the Court created a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
for certain searches based upon a search warrant later found to be defec-
tive. Central to the Court's holding was its conclusion that a good faith
exception would be unlikely to weaken the exclusionary rule's deterrence
of police misconduct. 126 Justice Blackmun wrote separately to empha-
size the importance of the Court's relying primarily on a deterrence
rationale:
[A]ny empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a
particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one.... If it
should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material
change in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall
have to reconsider what we have undertaken here. The logic of a deci-
sion that rests on untested predictions about police misconduct de-
mands no less.127
Justice Blackmun's opinion makes clear that, as better empirical re-
search develops, a skillful defense attorney may be able to challenge the
Leon holding in future cases or, at least, to keep Leon's holding limited to
search warrants on empirical grounds. Evidence that police misconduct
is increasing after Leon would justify changing the Leon rule. If the
Court rejected such evidence, it could do so only by rejecting Leon's logic
in favor of a justification that is not empirically-based and yet is
defensible.128
This latter point raises another related issue. Justice Brennan au-
thored a dissenting opinion in Leon, in which Justice Marshall joined,
that challenged the wisdom of relying solely on an empirical rationale:
"By remaining within its redoubt of empiricism and by basing the rule
solely on the deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the rule of its
legitimacy."1 29 What Justice Brennan was, in part, referring to was the
historical justification of the exclusionary rule on the grounds that it de-
ters police misconduct and preserves the integrity of the judicial system
by insulating the court from involvement in police wrongdoing.130 Ex-
126. Id at 922.
127. Id at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
128. See Faigman, supra note 65, at 588-89 (articulating similar analysis of Leon).
129. Leon, 468 U.S. at 931 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. See id at 936-43; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
Mapp held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in state trials. The Court in
Mapp articulated the justifications for the exclusionary rule as follows. First, "the purpose of
the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."' Id. at 656 (quoting
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). Second, the exclusionary rule is justified by
the "imperative of judicial integrity." Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at
222). For another interesting suggested use of social science (in addition to that in Leon) in
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ploring the potential conflict between utilitarian, empirically based ratio-
nales and those that focus on basic values fundamental to Fourth
Amendment purposes would seem to be an excellent vehicle both for
classroom discussion and real-world advocacy.
The second use of social science in criminal procedure-the applica-
tion of existing doctrine-has already been adverted to in this essay's
discussion of the value of examining the psychological literature on the
causes of eyewitness misidentifications before studying lineups and
photospreads. 31 Similar research has focused on the effect certain intel-
lectual and emotional impairments have on the ability to understand Mi-
randa warnings. 132 These areas, and many others, 133 should be of central
importance to the modem criminal practitioner.
But the study of these principles is important for another reason.
They emphasize that, contrary to the message imparted by the tradi-
tional case method, the law is not a clearly bounded discipline distinct
from all others. Instead, good lawyering requires the ability and will to
attend to other disciplines. Encouraging the development of such an atti-
tude is central to an alternative model of law teaching.
IV. Conclusion
The case method has been extensively and deservedly criticized for
failing to offer students sufficient guidance in how to perform their tasks,
to address the artistry of lawyering, or to take cognizance of the mul-
crafting constitutional rules of criminal procedure, see Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S.
Laufer, Illinois v. Rodriguez and the Social Psychology of Third Party Consent, 27 CRIM. L.
BULL. 42 (1991) (discussing discrepancies between judicial assumptions about lay perceptions
of risk and consent and actual lay consensus).
131. See supra text accompanying note 54.
132. Lanyon, Psychological Assessment in Court-Related Settings in PROFESSIONAL Psy-
CHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 260-68 (1986).
133. Particularly interesting to the author is the data gathered by animal behaviorists on
factors affecting dog-scenting accuracy, a critical question in the use of dogs sniffing for drugs
and in dog scent lineups. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific
Myth of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15 (1990). In a dog scent lineup, a dog sniffs
an object known to have been handled by the wrongdoer and then sniffs persons in a line,
perhaps "alerting" to one of those persons; the "alert" is offered as substantive evidence that
the defendant committed the crime. IM at 17. Other uses of social science by the modem
criminal practitioner have included: seeking to establish racial bias in the administration of
the death penalty, Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Social Scientist in Court, in EXPERT WITNESSES:
CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE COURTROOM 20 (1987); proving insanity and automatism, ROBERT
F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY:
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1991); and proving the existence of the battered woman and rape
trauma syndromes, David McCord, Profiles, Syndromes, and Other Mental Exotica: A New
Approach to the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66
OR. L. REv. 19 (1987).
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tifaceted way in which lawyers really think. Even excellent casebooks,
like White and Tomkoviez', deserve these same criticisms, for they are
the primary tools (apart from the teacher) for implementing the Langdel-
lian case method.
A broad-based response to these criticisms is unlikely to come about
in the classrooms if casebook authors do not jettison the fundamental
assumptions of the case method. The reason for this is simple: faculty
have too many competing demands-for scholarship, individual student
counseling, committee work, and public service-to be expected to adopt
a new method of teaching in substantive courses without being given new
tools to do so.13 4 Once casebooks are revised, relatively little additional
faculty effort will be necessary and, for this reason, many law teachers
might at least consider trying a new approach.
This essay has sought to advance a new approach to teaching law by
comparing the image of a fine casebook written in the traditional mold
with the image of what an alternative casebook might look like. Having
examined the fundamental assumptions of, and the criticisms leveled at,
the traditional approach, I have suggested at least some ways to respond
to those criticisms. It is hoped that this essay will contribute to the de-
bate about where law teaching should go by focusing attention on an
element of teaching that is surprisingly often ignored: the casebook. It is
further hoped that some of my colleagues will take up the challenge of
writing criminal procedure (and other) casebooks in an alternative mold,
for that is, in part, what this essay has sought to achieve.
134. A student reading a draft of this essay noted, "Surely professors share some of the
blame; after all, they write and create the market for most casebooks." The student is un-
doubtedly correct, but assigning blame does little to promote change. If professors take up the
call to write casebooks (perhaps it would be better to call them "textbooks") in a new mold, it
will be easier to persuade professors to try the new approach in the classroom. Moreover,
academics are indeed subjected to heavy professional demands (albeit rewarding ones), a real-
ity that makes it unlikely that much of the professoriate can or will change their teaching
methods without substantial help in doing so from new casebook authors.
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